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I.

INTRODUCTION

It has been my pleasure and honor to present the first Roberta Mitchell
Lecture, and to have done so in connection with this symposium on the
mortgage-foreclosure crisis. Although this article (based on that lecture)
does not address mortgage foreclosure per se, it provides a context in
which the crisis can be better understood.
Any discussion of the mortgage-foreclosure crisis must begin with
securitization. Securitization facilitates mortgage lending by enabling
lenders to easily monetize existing mortgage loans, thereby generating cash
to make new loans.1 Many believe, however, that the originate-todistribute model of securitization—enabling lenders to sell off their loans
as they are made—caused mortgage lenders to relax their lending
standards, leading to the multitude of risky subprime loans that now
constitute a huge portion of the foreclosures.2
In other contexts, I have argued that the originate-to-distribute model
of securitization was not the primary culprit. There was significant
government pressure on mortgage lenders to make and securitize subprime
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See, e.g., Stephen M. Juris, Scandal: Subprime Meltdown, Securitization Accounting,
237 N.Y. L.J. 4 (2007); FRANK J. FABOZZI & VINOD KOTHARI, INTRODUCTION TO
SECURITIZATION 3–11 (2008) (explaining that securitization is a vehicle for capital
formation).
2
See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime
Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV.1257, 1257–1311 (2009).
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mortgage loans to expand homeownership.3 The fall in lending standards
may also reflect distortions caused by the liquidity glut of that time, in
which lenders competed aggressively for business.4 Or, it may reflect
conflicts of interest between lending firms and their employees in charge
of setting lending standards, such as paying employees for booking loans
regardless of the loans’ long-term performance.5
Blaming the originate-to-distribute model also does not explain why
lending standards were not similarly lowered for non-mortgage securitized
loans. Nor does it explain why institutional investors—those who took the
bottom-line risk on the value of the mortgage loans—did not govern their
investments by the same strict lending standards they would observe but
for the separation of origination and ownership.
Regardless of what caused mortgage lending standards to fall, there is
no question that securitization increased the number of mortgage loans—
and thus the number of subprime mortgage loans—that could be (and in
fact were) made. This article begins by explaining securitization as well as
the parties in securitization transactions. In that context, it explores a
conundrum that I call the “protection gap.”
II. THE PROTECTION GAP
A. Positing the Protection Gap
In complex securitization transactions, there is the following
significant protection gap: When entering into a transaction, parties may be
unable or unwilling to pay the price for full protection.6 As a result,
transaction parties may choose or are forced to assume the good faith of
the other parties to the transaction and the consistency and completeness of
protections provided in the transaction documents. When things go wrong,
fingers are pointed at alleged wrongdoers, especially those with deep
pockets.
3

See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, The Lost Cause: The Failure of the Financial Crisis, FIN.
SERVS. OUTLOOK Jan.–Feb. 2011, available at http://www.aei.org/files/2011/02/10/FSO2011-02-g.pdf.
4
Id. at 3–4 (noting the deterioration of mortgage underwriting standards in the years
prior to the bubble’s collapse).
5
Carlos Garriga, Lending Standards in Mortgage Market, ECON. SYNOPSES, May 6,
2009, at 1, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/09/ES0923.pdf
(describing the loose lending standards through statistics).
6
See generally FABOZZI & KOTHARI, supra note 1, at 306–10 (explaining the concept of
protection buying and selling).
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I am not claiming that the protection gap is unique to complex
financing transactions. However, I believe that it is an order of magnitude
larger than the gap in traditional financings.7
The National Century Financial Enterprises (NCFE) bankruptcy
litigation provides an example of a protection gap in monitoring.8 NCFE
fraudulently misused collections on the securitized assets, causing more
than $2.6 billion of asset-backed securities to default.9 The investors sued
the trustee (among others), alleging failure to adequately monitor.10 Prior
to becoming aware of a default, however, the trustee’s job is purely
ministerial.11 Given the amount of money involved, it is unclear why the
investors themselves did not also engage in monitoring.
Other securitization-transaction disputes concern protection gaps in
documentation. For example, in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v.
Victoria Finance Ltd.,12 the parties alleged that the transaction documents
failed to explain how the waterfall of payments would be allocated after
default.13 In Luminent Mortgage Capital, Inc. v. HSBC Securities (USA)
Inc.,14 the complaint alleged that the transaction documents did not
adequately specify when the lender could collect bonds posted as
collateral.15 In HSH Nordbank AG v. UBS AG,16 the complaint alleged that
the transaction documents lacked clarity in establishing UBS’s level of
responsibility for monitoring the credit quality of the securitization
assets.17
7

See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enter., Inc., No. 2:03-md-1565, 2006 WL 2849784, at *2
(S.D. Ohio 2006).
9
Id. at *1.
10
Id. at *2 (alleging causes of action against the trustee that included breach of contract
and breach of fiduciary duty).
11
15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a) (2006). See also Elliott Assocs. v. J. Henry Schroder Bank &
Trust Co., 838 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1988).
12
No. 600071-08, 2008 WL 4263259, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2008).
13
Interpleader Complaint at 12–16, Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Victoria Fin.
Ltd., No. 600071-08, 2008 WL 4263259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2008).
14
No. 07-CV-9340 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 18, 2007).
15
Complaint at 2, 6, Luminent Mortg. Capital, Inc. v. HSBC Secs. (USA) Inc., No. 07CV-9340 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 18, 2007).
16
No. 600562/08, 2012 WL 997166, at *1–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2008).
17
Id. See also Complaint at 22–23, HSH Nordbank, AG v. UBS AG, No. 600562/08,
2012 WL 997166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2008).
8
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I will attempt to explain why this protection gap exists in securitization
transactions. First, however, securitization must be explained.
B. Securitization
Securitization refers to a category of financing transactions in which
companies sell income-producing financial assets (such as mortgage loans,
accounts receivable, and lease rentals) to a trust or other special-purpose
entity (SPE), sometimes interchangeably called a special-purpose vehicle
(SPV).18 This SPE finances its purchases by directly or indirectly selling
securities backed by rights to payments from these assets to investors.19
The investors look to the SPE and its purchased financial assets for
repayment.
Companies engaging in securitization transactions are called
“originators,” to distinguish them from the SPE companies.20 Securities of
an SPE that are paid, or “backed,” from collections on mortgage loans are
called “mortgage-backed securities” (MBS).21 Securities of an SPE that
are paid from collections on other types of financial assets are called
“asset-backed securities” (ABS).22 Sometimes even MBS are referred to as
ABS, the more inclusive category (mortgage loans being a type of asset).
Securitization is an important source of low-cost corporate financing23
as well as a critical means by which banks and other lenders turn their
18

See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L. BUS.
& FIN. 133, 135 (1994).
19
Id.
20
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539,
1540 (2004). To persuade investors to accept risk on an SPE’s securities, the originator
generally takes the first risk of loss on the underlying financial assets. It normally does this
through “overcollateralization” effectively transferring to the SPE financial assets
marginally in excess of the minimum amount needed to repay the securities issued by the
SPE. FABOZZI & KOTHARI, supra note 1, at 89–90; Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use
and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309,
1316 n.38 (2002).
21
See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG.
1, 6 (2011).
22
See Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 144.
23
Id. at 135. By not having to borrow from a bank (or other intermediary of funds), a
corporate originator avoids the bank’s profit mark-up. See Schwarcz, Securitization PostEnron, supra note 20, at 1551. This “disintermediation” is not dissimilar to buying
wholesale instead of paying the retail price.
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz,
(continued)
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financial assets into cash, thereby enabling them to continue making loans.
Securitization also helps to lower the cost of loans made to consumers.24
By 1992, securitization had become so important to the American
economy that the Securities and Exchange Commission observed that it
was “becoming one of the dominant means of capital formation in the
United States.”25 The growth of securitization continued throughout the
1990s and 2000s, rising to $11.8 trillion in 2008.26 During the 2008
financial crisis, the federal government initiated a $200 billion Term AssetBacked Securities Loan Facility (TALF) to keep the securitization markets
running, thereby assuring “the availability of credit to households and
businesses of all sizes.”27

Disintermediating Aravice: A Legal Framework for Commercially Sustainable
Microfinance, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2011). Securitization also accomplishes a
cost saving by allocating risk to parties with special securitization expertise and experience,
who are thereby better able to understand and assess risks associated with securitization
transactions. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION § 1:3 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that except for the most highly rated
issuers, securities issued in securitization transactions typically are more highly rated than
the issuer’s own debt securities—and that, even where the latter are more highly rated,
securitization provides additional market flexibility to obtain financing).
24
Cf. Patric H. Hendershott & James D. Shilling, The Impact of the Agencies on
Conventional Fixed-Rate Mortgage Yields, 2 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 101 (1989)
(finding that securitization of conforming fixed-rate mortgage loans significantly lowered
interest rates on mortgage loans relative to what they would otherwise have been); C.F.
Sirmans & John D. Benjamin, Pricing Fixed Rate Mortgages: Some Empirical Evidence, 4
J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 191 (1990) (finding significantly lower interest rates on fixed-rate
mortgages that can be sold in the secondary market versus those that cannot, thereby
indicating the value of the ability to securitize mortgages).
25
Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured Financings, 57
Fed. Reg. 56,248 (Nov. 27, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
26
The State of Securitization Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Secs., Ins., &
Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 33 (2011)
(prepared statement of Steven L. Schwarcz).
27
See, e.g., Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: Frequently Asked Questions,
FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (July 21, 2010), http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/talf_faq.html;
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) Terms and Conditions, FED. RESERVE,
1 (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/monetary
20081125a1.pdf.
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Securitization transactions are inherently complex insofar as they have
many different steps and many parties who participate at different stages.
From the standpoint of originator-risk assessment, however, they can be
less complex than ordinary lending. This is because in a properly
structured securitization, the sale of the financial assets to the SPE
separates payment risk from the risks generally associated with the
originator, including the risk of originator default. This is referred to as
achieving “bankruptcy remoteness.”28 Bankruptcy remoteness can reduce
asymmetric information by enabling the investors to focus on risks
specifically associated with well-defined and well-diversified financial
assets.29
Certain types of securitization transactions can inadvertently cause
information failure, or at least make it difficult for investors and other
parties to understand risks associated with the transferred financial assets.
This occurs in securitizations of ABS and MBS already issued in prior
securitization transactions—effectively securitizations of securitizations—
where the resulting securities are issued in multiple layers of different
priorities.30 In these more complex transactions, relatively small errors in
cash-flow projections can have dramatic consequences.
For example, at least one cause of the 2008 financial crisis was that
relatively small errors in cash-flow projections (resulting from
unexpectedly high default rates due to initially declining housing prices on
subprime mortgage loans underlying a portion of the MBS supporting
these complex transactions) created defaults and ratings downgrades on
substantial amounts of securities issued in these transactions.31 The
28

See, e.g., Thomas J. Gordon, Securitization of Executory Future Flows as
Bankruptcy-Remote True Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2000).
29
See, e.g., Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and
Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 55, 66–67 (2011). Information asymmetry refers to a
situation in which one party has more information than another regarding, for example, the
quality or risk of an asset. See id. at 94 (explaining the asymmetries that have arisen from
“the modern financial innovation process”).
30
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 211, 220 (2009).
31
Cf. Joshua Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3
(2009) (finding that complex securitization transactions such as collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) “amplifie[d] errors in evaluating the risk of the underlying securities”).
See David Milliken & Richard Barley, ABS CDOs, at Heart of Crisis, May Disappear,
REUTERS NEWS (Apr. 1, 2008, 1:37 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/04/01/bis(continued)
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defaults and ratings downgrades occurred even before the financial crisis
itself began to cause massive job losses and a spiraling collapse of the
housing market.
III. HYPOTHESES AND TRANSACTION PARTIES
Several interrelated reasons can help to explain the existence of the
protection gap. Securitization transactions involve an extraordinary
multitude of transaction parties, which can make it unusually difficult to
coordinate or allocate responsibility among them.32 The multitude of
parties might also mislead some parties into thinking that other parties will
protect their interests, leading to overreliance. Therefore, one hypothesis
for the protection gap is that the multitude of parties creates collective
action problems.
Some securitization transactions, especially securitizations of
securitizations, are also extremely complex, in both their design and
documentation.33 The structured nature of these transactions—including
their many different steps and the different parties who participate at each
step—also introduces novel elements that are atypical in ordinary
financing, such as lending. By making it difficult to comprehend the
transaction as an entirety, these complexities and novelties create
uncertainty, causing parties to over-focus on relatively simple and
straightforward elements, such as the underlying financial assets (e.g.,
mortgage loans), and to under-focus on less certain elements, such as the
structure and the documentation.34 This suggests another hypothesis for

assetbackedsecurities-idUKL0161391420080401 (“The use of credit derivatives in fact
allowed more exposure to be created than the amount of underlying bonds issued.”). See
also David Reilly, Center of a Storm: How CDOs Work, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2007),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118255822369045404.html (“CDOs have generated debate
because they are complex, and pose a risk because they are several steps removed from the
actual asset, or debt, that is being packaged.”).
32
Cf. Gretchen Morgenson, Get Ready, Get Set, Point Fingers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2009, at B1 (asking who should be responsible in a failed MBS transaction).
33
Schwarcz, supra note 30, at 220.
34
Indeed, there may be rational ignorance in parties not understanding everything. Cf.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L.
REV. 1109, 1113–15 (2008) (arguing that the cost of fully understanding disclosure may
appear ex ante to exceed its benefits); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure
Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 13–15 (2004).
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the existence of the protection gap—the complexity and novelty of
securitization transactions undermine analysis.
Even traditional financing transactions can, to some extent, have
protection gaps. Companies with ongoing business relationships typically
operate based on mutual trust established through long-standing repeated
contacts between the companies.35 Trust plays a crucial role in creating
and managing inter-company alliances because it “reduces complex
realities far more quickly and economically than prediction, authority, or
bargaining.”36 It therefore is common for transaction parties to assume the
good faith of other transaction parties. Similarly, even in traditional
financing transactions, it may be impossible to anticipate, and therefore
contractually protect against, every possibility.37
Securitization
transactions, however, can multiply the protection gap because they have
many more parties, often with complex interrelationships, and much more
complex and novel documentation and structures.
A. Transaction Parties
In general, the transaction parties in a securitization transaction include
the originator, the SPE (sometimes multiple SPEs), underwriters, multiple
classes (or tranches) of investors having different payment priorities, rating
agencies, trustees, servicers, and professionals such as lawyers and
accountants. Sometimes additional parties, such as monoline insurance
companies, act as credit enhancers. I will not treat monoline insurance
companies as separate parties, however, because from a risk-analysis
standpoint, they are effectively lower priority, or “subordinated,” investors.
Underwriters help the SPE issue its securities by marketing the
securities to potential investors.38 Under the federal securities laws, they
35

Thierry Volery & Stan Mensik, The Role of Trust in Creating Effective Alliances: A
Managerial Perspective, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 987, 987–92 (1998).
36
Id. at 993. There is a significant literature on relational contracting, in which parties
with ongoing business relationships deal on the basis of trust. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein &
Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J.
POL. ECON. 615 (1981); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27
(1980).
37
Volery & Mensik, supra note 35, at 988–89.
38
Katina J. Dorton, Auctioning New Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA. L. REV.
1381, 1381–82 (1985). Underwriters are paid fees for their services. Id. For example, an
underwriter may earn a spread equal to the difference between the amount paid to the issuer
of the securities and the offering price to investors, net of expenses incurred.

2012]

STRUCTURING RESPONSIBILITY

811

must provide investors in public deals with detailed information regarding
the issued securities39 (usually included in a prospectus or a supplement
thereto). However, most securities are issued by SPEs in private
placements.40
Investors are typically large, sophisticated financial institutions, such
as banks, pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds.41 Investors
choose the priority level of the securities they purchase.42 The most senior
priority securities are paid first; more subordinated priority securities are
paid thereafter, and thus are the first to absorb losses on the underlying
financial assets.43 This makes the senior securities less risky than the
average risk on the SPE’s financial assets because collections on all those
assets, even collections intended to otherwise support payment of
subordinated priority securities, are dedicated first to assure payment of the
senior securities.44 This so-called “senior-subordinated” structure enables
an SPE to sell very highly rated senior securities to investors who demand
a relatively risk-free financial product.
Rating agencies are private companies, such as Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) and Moody’s, and provide credit ratings for debt securities,
including MBS and ABS.45 A rating reflects their assessment of the
likelihood of timely payment of interest and return of principal to
investors.46 Rating agencies assert that they merely express an opinion,
39

See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1988)
(imposing duty to file periodic reports); Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1988)
(imposing duty to make disclosures in connection with sale of securities).
40
Edward T. McDermott, The Private Offering Exemption, 59 IOWA L. REV. 525, 525–
26 (1973–1974).
41
K INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE PUBLICATIONS, INC., MORTGAGE-RELATED SECURITIES
HOLDINGS BY INVESTOR (The Mortgage Market Statistical Annual–Vol. II CD-ROM, rel.
2010).
42
Joel Telpner, A Securitisation Primer for First Time Issuers, in GLOBAL
SECURITIZATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 6 (Greenberg Traurig ed., 2003), available at
http://www2.gtlaw.com/pub/articles/2003/telpner03a.pdf.
43
Id.
44
Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 378 (2008).
45
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2002).
46
See generally id. The highest rating on long-term debt securities is AAA, with
ratings descending to AA, then to A, and then to BBB and below. Id. at 7. The higher the
(continued)
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which they maintain is First Amendment protected speech, and that they do
not take on transactional responsibility.
Trustees have a bifurcated role in securitization transactions. Prior to a
default, the trustee’s role is largely ministerial,47 including holding security
for investors, monitoring covenant compliance, making payments,
investing idle assets, monitoring the servicer’s collections, and
administering the underlying financial assets.48 After default, however, a
trustee must act as a prudent person in the best interests of the investors.49
Servicers act on behalf of the SPE to collect the payments from the
underlying financial assets. To this end, a servicer performs administrative
duties that typically include mailing billing statements, collecting
payments, and supervising delinquent financial assets, such as engaging in
debt workout and foreclosure proceedings.50 The originator itself or an
affiliate of the originator, being familiar with and having procedures in
place to monitor and collect payment on the financial assets, often acts as
the servicer for a fee.51
Professionals include accountants and lawyers, encompassing both
outside and in-house counsel. The client, often acting through in-house
counsel, sets the scope of work of outside counsel.52 However, in-house
counsel may have a broader, perhaps more proactive, responsibility to the
rating, the lower the credit risk associated with the securities in question as determined by
the rating agency. Id. Ratings below BBB are deemed non-investment grade (or “junk,” as
in junk bonds) and indicate that full and timely repayment on the securities may be
speculative. See, e.g., Credit Ratings Definitions & FAQs, STANDARD & POOR’S,
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us#def_1 (last visited
Jan. 22, 2011).
47
15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a) (2006). See also Elliott Assocs. v. J. Henry Schroder Bank &
Trust Co., 838 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1988).
48
Christopher J. Brady et al., The Role of the Trustee in Securitization Transactions, in
SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS 9–3 (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 2010).
49
15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (2006). See also Susan J. Macaulay, US: The Role of the
Securitisation Trustee, in GLOBAL SECURITISATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE (Gardner
Carton & Douglas LLP ed., 2004) (noting these duties may include enforcing remedies,
serving as backup servicer, and taking action in bankruptcy).
50
FABOZZI & KOTHARI, supra note 1, at 124–28.
51
SCHWARCZ, supra note 23, § 4:5, at 4–10; ANDREW DAVIDSON ET AL.,
SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 521–22 (2003).
52
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance,
84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005).
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client.53
In-house counsel are particularly well-situated to serve
anticipatory and preventative functions for their business clients.54 They
are usually present and can offer legal advice early in the decision-making
process.55 Because they only serve a single client,56 in-house counsel
benefit from superior information about that client’s organization,
operations, and business culture.57
Accountants act on behalf of the originator to decide how the
securitization transaction should be treated (or “booked”) for accounting
purposes in the originator’s financial statements. The primary question is
whether to book the transaction as a sale of the financial assets or, instead,
as a loan secured by the financial assets.58 In answering this question, the
accountant’s duty is to act fairly and objectively.59
IV. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
Although the scope of this article does not permit a full proof, let us
begin to test the hypotheses for the protection gap in securitization
53

See Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully & Steven L. Schwarcz, In-House Counsel’s
Role in the Structuring of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 521 (2012).
54
See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 195 (2006) (“[T]he inside counsel is uniquely positioned to specialize in
preventive law.”); Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite
Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 280–81 (1985) (“The general counsel, as a part of senior
management . . . has both the right and responsibility to insist upon early legal involvement
in major transactions that will raise significant legal issues.”); Richard S. Gruner, Corporate
Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs and Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J.
1113, 1116 (1997) (“[T]oday’s general counsel is much more concerned with forwardlooking, systematic features of corporate law compliance.”); Robert E. Rosen, The Inside
Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J.
479, 519 (1989) (“As in the management of outside counsel, in preventive law practice,
corporations rely on inside counsel to implement and determine corporate interests.”);
Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the In-House
Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 115 (2011) (explaining that in-house counsel
possesses traits “essential to practicing strategic preventive law”).
55
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 54, at 281; Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 54, at 113.
56
Albeit a complex client, generally speaking. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 54, at
111.
57
Id. at 113–14.
58
Schwarcz, supra note 52, at 2.
59
Id. at 27.
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transactions—that the multitude of parties creates collective action
problems, and that the complexity and novelty of the transactions
undermine analysis. In preparation, we must first distinguish the
protection gap from larger issues of financial failure.
In other research, I have explored those larger issues, including the
problem of systemic risk.60 I have argued that financial failure should be
addressed within an overall conceptual framework, which I call the “3Csand-TOC.”61 This is comprised of four types of market imperfections: (1)
conflicts of interest;62 (2) complacency of investors and other market
participants; (3) complexity of financial markets and of the securities
traded therein; and (4) a type of tragedy-of-the-commons (TOC) collective
action problem in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources
accrue to individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to
maximize use of the resources, whereas the costs of exploitation, which
affect the real economy, are distributed among an even wider class of
persons.63
The 3Cs-and-TOC framework can help to inform an understanding of
the protection gap in securitization transactions. Complexity is itself part
of one of the hypotheses for the protection gap. Complacency contributes
to creating the gap, and conflicts and the TOC almost certainly exacerbate
it. Because the protection gap ties to a particular type of financial

60

For an introduction, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law &
Bus., Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Keynote Address at the European Central Bank Seminar on
Regulation of Financial Services in the EU: Surveillance—Resilience—Transparency: A
Regulatory Framework for Managing Systemic Risk (Oct. 20, 2011) (transcript available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2459).
61
See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards
an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1362–70, 1375–76 (2011).
62
For example, I have examined the existence of secondary management conflicts, in
which the investors’ analysts recommend deals based on ratings and the like without
adequate further inquiry. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial
Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457
(2009).
63
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200 (2008). I recently refined
this conceptual framework in a speech at a European Central Bank conference. See
Schwarcz, supra note 60.
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transaction (i.e., securitization) and because it has consequences that may
not be systemic, it is a subset of financial failure.64
A. Hypothesis: The Multitude of Parties in Securitization Transactions
Creates Collective Action Problems
One scholar has recently developed a multitude-of-parties type of
argument to broadly explain financial transaction failures, arguing they
result from a “multiple gatekeeper phenomenon.”65 Because of the
multitude of professionals involved in complex financial transactions
(Tuch focuses on outside law firms66), professionals individually have an
incentive to minimize their role.67
Focusing on collective action problems of professionals, however,
ignores the essential fact that professionals are merely agents of the
principals—usually the underwriters and investors. The real question
should be why the principals who actually suffer losses—such as
investors—do not adequately protect themselves.68
To some extent, the answer may be that the multitude of investors can
mean that no individual investor has enough at risk to engage in sufficient

64

The protection gap also represents more of a tactical failure—the failure of
transaction parties to design appropriate documentation and monitoring protections.
65
Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1585 (2010)
(introducing the term “multiple gatekeeper phenomenon”).
66
Tuch’s article does not address why in-house counsel do not fill the gap left by
outside counsel, as legal gatekeepers. See generally Barnes, Cully & Schwarcz, supra note
53 (discussing the role of in-house counsel as gatekeepers in securitization transactions).
67
Tuch, supra note 65, at 1603. See also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1166–72, 1231–32, 1246–48 (2005) (discussing lawyers hiding in
the shadows of the divisions of responsibility); Bevis Longstreth, Corporate Law: Problems
in the Corporate Bar (as It Appears to a Retired Practitioner), MONT. LAW., Feb. 2006, at
22–23 (discussing practitioners’ tendency to narrow their vision to “avoid the difficulty of
having to say ‘no’” to a client).
68
Tuch also argues that the multiple-gatekeeper phenomenon allows clients to position
themselves between gatekeepers so that no party has complete knowledge of transactions.
See Tuch, supra note 65, at 1603–04 (discussing the merger of Bank of America and
Merrill Lynch as an illustration of this concern). Although this argument incongruously
assumes that the clients themselves wish for court failure, it might have some explanatory
power in a fraud.
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due diligence—a problem “akin to a tragedy of the anticommons.”69
Another answer may be that the multitude of parties misleads investors
into thinking that other parties will protect their interests, causing
overreliance. Consider how that latter answer may play out with the
example of overreliance on trustees.
There certainly appears to be overreliance on trustees. Because
securitization transactions are essentially financings,70 the trustee in these
transactions is not a traditional fiduciary trustee, but rather an indenture
trustee or a collateral trustee.71 This type of trustee “is more like a
stakeholder whose duties and obligations are exclusively defined by the
terms of the indenture agreement.”72
In accord with this stakeholder nature, the trustee’s legal duties are, at
least prior to a default, ministerial.73 The American Bankers Association
has also observed that trustees—who receive low fees74 and usually are late
additions to a securitization transaction, with little opportunity to negotiate
their position75—view themselves as having little substantive oversight and
no duties to make independent investigations to detect default, fraud, or

69

Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 517 (2012).
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling
the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 569–70 (2003) (discussing trust indentures used in
financing transactions and the nature of the “hybrid form of a trust” created by such
indentures).
71
See generally In re Med. Capital Sec. Litig., No. SAML 10–2145 DOC, 2011 WL
5067208, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2011) (discussing the differences between these types of
trustees and traditional fiduciary trustees).
72
Meckel v. Cont’l Res. Co., 758 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1985).
73
See Macaulay, supra note 49; Levitin & Twomey, supra note 21, at 58–63 (noting
that residential mortgage-backed securities trustees are “passive ministerial entities and
financial backstops”).
74
See, e.g., Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch: Seller/Servicer Risk Trumps Trustee’s
Role in U.S. ABS Transactions (Feb. 24, 2003), available at http://www.securitization.net/
pdf/fitch_risk_022403.pdf (“The trustee’s role in ABS transactions has clearly been
marginalized over time due to a combination of fear of liability and low fees.”).
75
AM. BANKERS ASS’N, CORPORATE TRUST COMMITTEE, THE TRUSTEE’S ROLE IN ASSETBACKED SECURITIES 4 (Mar. 12, 3003), available at http://findsenlaw.files.
wordpress.com/2010/11/11-12-10-aba-trustee-whitepaper1.pdf (suggesting that the
Corporate Trust Committee’s report represented the views of “virtually all trustees for
asset-backed securities”).
70
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breach of transaction documents.76 Moreover, trustees are often illequipped to fill gaps in securitization transactions because they do not have
the expertise to make substantive business decisions, especially when the
language in the documentation is vague or ambiguous.77
Transaction parties, however, often have highly divergent views of the
role of the trustee, sometimes viewing the trustee as a crucial figure in
complex financial transactions.78 This can lead to overreliance. For
example, prominent rating agency Moody’s has stated that trustees “have
argued that their conduct is subject to the ‘prudent person’ standard of care
only after a transaction has defaulted.”79 Yet, in “the majority of cases, and
especially transactions involving unrated or noninvestment-grade-rated
seller/servicers, this was not Moody’s understanding of the trustee’s role
when these transactions were initially rated.”80 Moody’s has even
suggested that trustee performance falls short of expectations in monitoring
cash flows, taking action when evidence of improprieties arise, assuming
backup servicing duties, and noting covenant breaches.81
The litigation surrounding the bankruptcy of NCFE exemplifies how
overreliance on trustees can cause a protection gap.82 Recall that the
investors alleged a wide range of causes of action against the trustee,
including failure to adequately monitor.83 The court, however, dismissed
all claims except those founded on express provisions of the transaction
documents, accepting the trustee’s narrow conception of its duties.84 The

76

Id. at 6.
Id. at 11.
78
In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., No. 2:03-md-1565, 2006 WL 2849784, at *2
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2006).
79
Claire M. Robinson, Moody’s Re-Examines Trustees’ Role in ABS and RMBS, in
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE: STRUCTURED FINANCE 1, 2 (Feb. 4, 2003).
80
Id. at 1 (noting the trustee’s “key role” in securitization transactions).
81
Id. at 2.
82
See supra text accompanying notes 8–11 (discussing that litigation). NCFE provided
health care receivable financing by wholly-owned SPEs offering bonds backed by the
receivables. Suffering from shortages of cash, NCFE transferred funds between reserve
accounts. NCFE’s indiscretions eventually led to bankruptcy and a deluge of litigation.
Brady et al., supra note 48, at 9–3.
83
See supra text accompanying note 20.
84
In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., No. 2:03-md-1565, 2006 WL 2849784, at *2
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2006) (“The Master Indenture created a narrow role for the Trustees,
(continued)
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investors therefore relied (or, at least, claimed they relied) on the trustee to
perform monitoring duties that the trustee legally had no obligation to (and
therefore did not) perform.
An unanswered question is the extent to which the public nature of
these litigations is resolving—and are likely to resolve—overreliance on
trustees.
B. Hypothesis: The Complexity and Novelty of Securitization Transactions
Undermine Analysis
In this hypothesis, complexity and novelty create uncertainty, which
undermines analysis. The greater the complexity and novelty, the harder
something is to understand and the less certain we are about it. We then
focus on the simpler and more straightforward elements with which we are
familiar. In a complex and unusual MBS transaction, for example, we may
focus on the fact that the transaction is supported by mortgage loans,
missing key elements of the transaction’s structure.
The notion that uncertainty undermines analysis is fairly wellestablished. In behavioral psychology, for example, uncertainty can cause
people to view actual and certain costs as more important than uncertain
future costs, even though the latter, if they occur, may be huge.85 This
might help explain why even sophisticated institutional investors viewed
the relatively high interest rates on MBS as more important than possible
future risk on those securities.
Uncertainty can also reduce the perception of responsibility. For
example, uncertainty enables soldiers in firing squads to choose to believe
they did not fire the kill shot.86 Perhaps this also helps explain why
investors did not govern their investments by the same strict lending
standards they would observe but for the separation of origination and
ownership.87
Uncertainty also causes people to believe what they want to believe. It
is reported that King Croesus of Lydia wanted to make war on Cyrus, but
was wary of doing so without heavenly sanction. After singling out the
Delphic Oracle as the most reliable, the King’s messengers “asked the
who undertook to perform ‘only such duties as are specifically set forth in [the] Master
Indenture.’”).
85
Cf. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 61.
86
David Usborne, Firing Squad Prepare for Grisly Duty, N.Z. HERALD NEWS, June 15,
2010, at 2.
87
See supra text accompanying note 5.
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practical question about the advisability of Croesus’ going to war, and
received the famous [and famously ambiguous] response that ‘Croesus by
crossing the Halys would destroy a mighty kingdom.’”88 Croesus
interpreted this to mean what he wanted to hear—that Cyrus would fall—
but in fact the empire that fell was his own.89 This may help to explain
why investors were prepared to believe that the AAA-rated and other
investment-grade rated securities issued in securitization transactions
(offering much higher returns than other similarly rated securities),
represented good investments even though they were at least partly backed
by subprime mortgages.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has explored a conundrum that I call the “protection gap.”
In complex securitization transactions, parties may be unable or unwilling
to pay the price for full protection. As a result, they may choose or are
forced to assume the good faith of the other parties to the transaction and
the consistency and completeness of protections provided in the transaction
documents.
The article identifies, and also tests, several interrelated hypotheses for
the protection gap. One hypothesis is that the multitude of parties in
securitization transactions creates collective action problems. Another
hypothesis is that the complexity and novelty of securitization transactions
undermine analysis.
Even traditional financing transactions can, to some extent, have
protection gaps.
The article argues, however, that securitization
transactions can multiply the protection gap because they have many more
parties, often with complex interrelationships, and much more complex
and novel documentation and structures.
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REV. T. DEMPSEY, THE DELPHIC ORACLE: ITS EARLY HISTORY, INFLUENCE, AND FALL
70 (1972).
89
Id. at 71, 107 (discussing the historical method of the oracles as sheltering ignorance
behind a “studied ambiguity” and vagueness). This same method of response is said also to
be used today by fortune tellers. See J. Barkley Rosser Jr., Alternative Keynesian and Post
Keynesian Perspectives on Uncertainty and Expectations, 23 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON.
545, 554–57 (2001) (arguing that uncertainty leads to self-fulfilling mistakes).

